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Abstract
A modal logic is non-iterative if it can be defined by axioms that do not nest modal op-
erators, and rank-1 if additionally all propositional variables in axioms are in scope of
a modal operator. It is known that every syntactically defined rank-1 modal logic can
be equipped with a canonical coalgebraic semantics, ensuring soundness and strong
completeness. In the present work, we extend this result to non-iterative modal logics,
showing that every non-iterative modal logic can be equipped with a canonical coal-
gebraic semantics defined in terms of a copointed functor, again ensuring soundness
and strong completeness via a canonical model construction. Like in the rank-1 case,
the coalgebraic semantics is equivalent to a neighbourhood semantics with suitable
frame conditions, so that our main result may be phrased as saying that every non-
iterative modal logic is complete over its neighbourhood semantics. As an example
application of these results, we establish strong completeness of deontic logics with
factual detachment, strengthening previous weak completeness results.
Keywords: Coalgebraic logic, neighbourhood semantics, strong completeness,
canonical models, deontic logic
1 Introduction
Modal frame axioms are called non-iterative if they do not nest modal op-
erators, and rank-1 if additionally all occurrences of propositional variables
are under modal operators; logics are non-iterative or rank-1, respectively, if
they can be axiomatized by axioms of the correspondingly restricted shape.
Prominent examples include the K-axiom ✷(a → b) → ✷a → ✷b, which is
rank-1, and the T-axiom ✷a → a, which is non-iterative. Lewis [9] shows
that every non-iterative modal logic is weakly complete over neighbourhood
semantics (i.e. every consistent formula is satisfiable). Without restrictions on
the axioms, there are modal logics that are weakly complete but not strongly
complete (in the sense that every consistent set of formulae is satisfiable) over
neighbourhood semantics [17]. Previous work in coalgebraic logic [16] shows
that every rank-1 modal logic is even strongly complete over a canonical coal-
gebraic semantics that coincides with neighbourhood semantics. In the present
paper, we extend this result to non-iterative logics: We show that every (syn-
tactically given) non-iterative modal logic is strongly complete over a canonical
coalgebraic semantics, and hence over the equivalent neighbourhood semantics.
2 Non-iterative Modal Logics are Coalgebraic
Generally, the semantic framework of coalgebraic logic [2] supports general
proof-theoretic, algorithmic, and meta-theoretic results that can be instantiated
to the logic of interest, cutting out much of the repetitive labour associated with
the iterative process of designing an application-specific logic. The framework
is based on casting state-based models of various types (e.g. relational, proba-
bilistic, neighbourhood-based, or game-based) as coalgebras for a functor, the
latter to be thought of as encapsulating the structure of the successors of a
state.
It has been shown that the modal logic of the class of all coalgebras for a
given functor can always be axiomatized in rank 1 [14]. Conversely, as indicated
above, every rank-1 logic has a coalgebraic semantics [16]; that is, rank-1 ax-
ioms can be absorbed into a functor. The coalgebraic treatment of non-iterative
axioms thus requires a generalization to copointed functors, to be thought of
as incorporating the present state as well as its successors. Indeed it turns out
that to obtain strong completeness, it is useful to generalize further to weakly
copointed functors, in which the present state is virtualized as an ultrafilter,
and subsequently restrict to proper coalgebras of such weakly copointed func-
tors, in which all these virtual points actually materialize. Our main result thus
states more precisely that every non-iterative logic is sound and strongly com-
plete for the class of proper coalgebras of a canonical weakly copointed functor
we construct; strong completeness w.r.t. a canonical copointed subfunctor then
follows. As indicated above, this result translates back into strong completeness
w.r.t. neighbourhood semantics. We complement this statement with an (eas-
ier) result showing that the modal logic of a copointed functor can always be
equipped with a weakly complete non-iterative axiomatization, justifying the
slogan that non-iterative logics are precisely the logics of copointed functors.
We illustrate the use of this result on certain deontic logics that on the
one hand avoid the deontic explosion problem (ruling out normality, and hence
Kripke semantics) and on the other hand allow for factual detachment, embod-
ied in properly non-iterative axioms [19]. The only known semantics for such
logics is neighbourhood semantics, and it is only known to be weakly complete
(by the mentioned results of Lewis [9], alternatively by a concrete proof given
in the online appendix of [19]); our results imply that it is in fact strongly
complete.
Organization We recall the syntactic notion of non-iterative modal logic [9]
in Section 2. In Section 3, we recall the semantic framework of coalgebraic
logic, and discuss copointed and weakly copointed functors. Our main tech-
nical tool is the 0-1-step logic of a non-iterative coalgebraic logic, introduced
in Section 4. We establish the easier direction of the relationship between
non-iterative modal logics and coalgebraic modal logic in Section 5, where we
show that the modal logic of coalgebras for a copointed functor is always non-
iterative (and has the finite model property). Our main result, which states
that conversely, every non-iterative modal logic is strongly complete over a
canonical coalgebraic semantics that coincides with neighbourhood semantics,
is shown in Sections 6 and 7. In Section 8, we present applications to deontic
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logics. Some proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
2 Non-iterative Modal Logics
A (modal) similarity type Λ is a set of modal operators with associated finite
arity. The set F(Λ) of Λ-formulae is given by the grammar
φ1, . . . , φn ::= ⊥ | ¬φ1 | φ1 ∧ φ2 | L(φ1, . . . , φn)
where L ∈ Λ has arity n. Additional Boolean operators →, ↔, ∨ and ⊤ can
then be defined as usual. We denote by |φ| the size of a formula φ, measured
as the number of subformulae of φ. The grammar does not include proposi-
tional atoms as a separate syntactic category; however, these can be cast as
nullary modalities. We thus distinguish propositional atoms from propositional
variables, which are used to formulate axioms and rules.
Definition 2.1 Let Prop(V ) denote the set of propositional formulae φ over a
given set V (i.e. φ ::= ⊥ | a | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2, with a ranging over V ), and put
Λ(V ) = {L(a1, . . . , an) | L ∈ Λ n-ary, a1, . . . , an ∈ V }.
The elements of V are typically thought of as propositional variables. A one-
step formula or rank-1 formula over V is a formula in Prop(Λ(Prop(V ))),
and a 0-1-step formula or a non-iterative formula over V is a formula in
φ ∈ Prop(Λ(Prop(V )) ∪ V ). In words, a formula φ over V is non-iterative
if it does not contain nested modal operators, and a non-iterative formula φ
is rank-1 if additionally every variable in φ lies under a modal operator. We
generally refer to maps of the form σ : V → Z that we use to replace entities of
type V with entities of type Z in formulae as Z-substitutions on V , and write
φσ for the result of applying σ to a formula φ over V .
As indicated previously, the axiom ✷(a → b) → ✷a → ✷b (with a, b propo-
sitional variables) is rank-1, and ✷a → a is non-iterative. We define modal
logics L = (Λ,A) syntactically by a similarity type Λ and a set A of axioms
(in the given similarity type), determining the set of derivable formulae via the
usual proof system as recalled below. A logic is non-iterative (rank-1 ) if all
its axioms are non-iterative (rank-1). Given a logic L = (Λ,A), we say that a
Λ-formula ψ is derivable, and write ⊢L ψ, if ψ can be derived in finitely many
steps via the following rules:
(Ax)
ψσ
(ψ ∈ A, σ an F(Λ)-substitution)
(P )
φ1 . . . φn
ψ
({φ1, . . . , φn} ⊢PL ψ) (C)
φ1 ↔ ψ1 . . . φn ↔ ψn
L(φ1, . . . , φn)↔ L(ψ1, . . . , ψn)
where by {φ1, . . . , φn} ⊢PL ψ we indicate that ψ is derivable from assumptions
φ1, . . . , φn by propositional reasoning (e.g. propositional tautologies and modus
ponens). The last rule is known as the congruence rule or replacement of
4 Non-iterative Modal Logics are Coalgebraic
equivalents. For a set Φ of Λ-formulae, we write Φ ⊢L ψ if ⊢L (φ1∧. . .∧φn)→ ψ
for some φ1, . . . , φn ∈ Φ. We say that Φ is L-consistent, or just consistent, if
Φ 6⊢L ⊥. A formula φ is consistent if {φ} is consistent.
Remark 2.2 Non-iterative logics can alternatively be presented in terms of
proof rules: A non-iterative rule φ/ψ over V consists of a premiss φ ∈ Prop(V )
and a conclusion ψ ∈ Prop(Λ(V ) ∪ V ). There are mutual conversions between
the two formats, the conversion from axioms to rules being straightforward, and
the conversion from rules to axioms being based on Boolean unification: Given
a non-iterative rule φ/ψ, pick a projective unifier [3] of φ, i.e. a substitution σ
such that φσ and φ→ (a↔ σ(a)), for all variables a in ψ, are tautologies, and
replace φ/ψ with the axiom ψσ; further details are as in the rank-1 case [14].
Remark 2.3 As the syntax of the logic itself does not include propositional
variables, the above system also does not derive formulae with variables. If de-
sired, propositional variables in formulae can be emulated by introducing fresh
propositional atoms (treated as nullary modal operators as indicated above). In
particular, if substitution is made to apply to these fresh propositional atoms,
then the standard substitution rule φ/φσ becomes admissible.
3 Coalgebraic Semantics
We next recall basic definitions in universal coalgebra [13] and coalgebraic
logic [2], which will form the underlying semantic framework for our main
result. We briefly recall requisite categorical definitions; some familiarity with
basic category theory will nevertheless be helpful (e.g. [1]).
The underlying principle of (set-based) universal coalgebra is to encapsulate
a type of state-based systems as an endofunctor T : Set → Set (briefly called
a set functor) where Set is the category of sets and functions. Thus, T assigns
to each set X a set TX , and to each map f : X → Y a map Tf : TX → TY ,
preserving identities and composition. We think of TX as a type of structured
collections over X . A basic example is the (covariant) powerset functor P ,
which assigns to each set X its powerset PX , and to each map f : X → Y
the map Pf : PX → PY that takes direct images, i.e. Pf(A) = f [A] for A ∈
PX . The most relevant example for our present purposes is the neighbourhood
functor N , defined as follows. The contravariant powerset functor Q is a
functor of type Setop → Set, i.e. reverses the direction of maps; it maps a
set X to its powerset QX = PX , and a map f : X → Y to the preimage map
Qf : QY → QX , i.e. Qf(B) = f−1[B] for B ∈ QY . For any functor F , we
indicate by F op the functor that acts like F but on the opposite categories, i.e.
with arrows reversed in both domain and codomain. Then, we define N as the
composite
N = Q ◦ Qop : Set→ Set.
We think of elements of NX as neighbourhood systems over X .
Given a functor T , systems are then abstracted as T -coalgebras C = (X, ξ)
consisting of a set X of states and a transition function ξ : X → TX . We think
of ξ as assigning to each state x a structured collection ξ(x) of successors. E.g.
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P-coalgebras are just Kripke frames, assigning as they do to each state a set
of successors, and N -coalgebras are neighbourhood frames, where each state
receives a collection of neighbourhoods.
Modal operators are semantically interpreted by predicate liftings [11,15]:
Definition 3.1 An n-ary predicate lifting for a set functor T is a natural trans-
formation λ : Qn → Q ◦ T op, with Q being the contravariant powerset functor
recalled above. So λ is a family of functions λX , indexed over all sets X , such
that for all f : X → Y and Bi ⊆ Y , i = 1, . . . , n,
λX(f
−1[B1], . . . , f
−1[Bn]) = (Tf)
−1[λY (B1, . . . , Bn)].
A Λ-structureM = (T, JLKL∈Λ) for a signature Λ consists of a functor T and an
n-ary predicate lifting JLK for every n-ary modal operator L ∈ Λ; we say thatM
is based on T . When there is no danger of confusion, we will occasionally refer
to the entire Λ-structure just as T .
Given a Λ-structureM based on T , we define the satisfaction relation x |=C φ
between states x in T -coalgebras C = (X, ξ) and Λ-formulae φ inductively by
x 6|=C ⊥
x |=C ¬φ iff x 6|=C φ
x |=C φ ∧ ψ iff x |=C φ and x |=C ψ
x |=C L(φ1, . . . φn) iff ξ(x) ∈ JLK(Jφ1KC , . . . , JφnKC)
where we write JφKC (or just JφK) for the extension {x ∈ X | x |=C φ} of φ.
Example 3.2 (i) As indicated above, Kripke frames are coalgebras for the
powerset functor P . The standard ✷ modality is interpreted over P via the
predicate lifting
J✷KX(A) = {B ∈ PX | B ⊆ A},
which in combination with the above definition of the satisfaction relation in-
duces precisely the usual semantics of ✷.
(ii) Probabilistic modal logic [8,5] has unary modal operators Lp indexed
over p ∈ [0, 1]∩Q, with Lpφ read ‘φ holds with probability at least p after the
next transition step’. It is interpreted over probabilistic transition systems (or
Markov chains), which are coalgebras for the discrete distribution functor D,
given on sets X by taking DX to be the set of discrete probability distributions
on X . The modal operators are then interpreted using the predicate liftings
JLpKX(A) = {µ ∈ DX | µ(A) ≥ p}.
(iii) As seen above, neighbourhood frames are coalgebras for the neighbour-
hood functor N . We capture the usual neighbourhood semantics of the ✷
modality by the predicate lifting
J✷KX(A) = {N ∈ NX | A ∈ N},
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that is, a state satisfies ✷φ iff the extension JφK is a neighbourhood of x. More
generally, a Λ-neighbourhood frame for a similarity type Λ is a pair (X, (νL)L∈Λ)
consisting of a set X of states and a family of functions νL : X → P((PX)n)
for L ∈ Λ n-ary. We refer to subsets of (PX)n as n-ary neighbourhood systems,
and to their elements as n-ary neighbourhoods ; if (A1, . . . , An) ∈ νL(x) for n-
ary L ∈ Λ, then (A1, . . . , An) is an (n-ary) L-neighbourhood of x. Satisfaction
of modalized formulae by states x ∈ X is then defined by
x |= L(φ1, . . . , φn) iff (Jφ1K, . . . , JφnK) ∈ νL(x);
in words, x |= L(φ1, . . . , φn) iff (Jφ1K, . . . , JφnK) is an L-neighbourhood of x.
Λ-neighbourhood frames are coalgebras for the functor NΛ defined by
NΛ =
∏
L∈Λ n-aryQ ◦ ((Q
op)n)
where product and n-th power (−)n are pointwise, i.e. NΛX =∏
L∈Λ n-aryQ((QX)
n). The corresponding predicate liftings are
JLKX(A1, . . . , An) = {(NL)L∈Λ ∈ NΛX | (A1, . . . , An) ∈ NL}.
Since we work with classical negation, we can reduce all reasoning problems to
satisfiability in the usual manner. Given a Λ-structure based on T , a formula φ
is valid if x |=C φ for all states x in T -coalgebras C, and a set Φ of formulae
is satisfiable if there exists a state x in a T -coalgebra C such that x |=C φ
for all φ ∈ Φ. A formula φ is satisfiable if {φ} is satisfiable. A logic L =
(Λ,A), or just A, is sound forM if all L-derivable formulae are valid overM,
weakly complete if all consistent formulae are satisfiable (equivalently all valid
formulae are derivable), and strongly complete if all consistent sets of formulae
are satisfiable (which is equivalent to completeness w.r.t. local consequence
from possibly infinite sets of assumptions.)
It has been shown that coalgebraic modal logics coincide with rank-1 log-
ics. More precisely, for every Λ-structureM there exists a rank-1 logic that is
weakly complete for M [14] (strong completeness cannot be expected as coal-
gebraic modal logics often fail to be compact, e.g. probabilistic modal logic as
described in Example 3.2.ii is not compact [14]). Conversely, given a rank-1
logic L = (Λ,A), there is a Λ-structure M such that L is sound and strongly
complete for M [16]; this Λ-structure is isomorphic to neighbourhood seman-
tics. Generally speaking, rank-1 axioms can be absorbed into the functor; as
a very simple example, the seriality axiom for Kripke frames, ¬✷⊥, can be
captured by replacing the powerset functor P with the non-empty powerset
functor P⋆, where P⋆X = {A ∈ PX | A 6= ∅}.
To cover non-iterative logics, we therefore need additional structure on the
functor that additionally caters for base points: A copointed functor (T, ε), or
just T when ε is clear from the context, consists of a functor T and a copoint ε,
i.e. a natural transformation ε : T → id where id denotes the identity functor.
Coalgebras C = (X, ξ) for a copointed functor are by default required to be
Forster and Schro¨der 7
proper, i.e. εX ◦ ξ = idX . Intuitively, a plain functor encapsulates only the
possible (structured collections of) successors that can be assigned to a given
present state, while a copointed functor additionally retains the information
about the present state itself, accessed via the copoint; the properness condition
ǫX ◦ ξ on coalgebras (X, ξ) of a copointed functor effectively demands that this
information is accurate, i.e. applying the copoint to ξ(x) actually returns the
present state x.
The main purpose of the information about the present state included in T
is to allow imposing relationships between the present point and its collection
of successors. Indeed, every functor T can be made copointed by passing to
the functor T × id (given on sets X by (T × id)X = TX ×X), with ε(t, x) =
x; we refer to copointed functors of this shape as trivially copointed, as they
impose no relationship between the present state and its collection of successors.
Copointed functors can absorb non-iterative axioms; e.g. the modal logic T is
captured by the copointed functor T given by TX = {(A, x) ∈ PX×X | x ∈ A}
(more details are given in Section 4), which imposes that the present state is
among its own successors; that is, proper T -coalgebras are precisely reflexive
Kripke frames. This functor T is our first example of a non-trivially copointed
functor; note that it is a subfunctor of the trivially copointed functor P × id.
For purposes of our strong completeness result, we make use of a relaxed notion
of copointed functor:
Definition 3.3 A weakly copointed functor (T, ε) (or just T when ε is clear
from the context) consists of a functor T and a weak copoint ε, i.e. a natural
transformation ε : T → U , where U denotes the (functor part of) the ultrafilter
monad. That is, UX is the set of ultrafilters on X , and Uf(α) = {B ⊆ Y |
f−1[B] ∈ α} for f : X → Y , α ∈ UX (so U is a subfunctor of the neighbourhood
functor N as in Example 3.2.iii). Then, a T -coalgebra structure ξ : X → TX
is proper if εX ◦ ξ = ηX where η : Id→ U is the unit of the ultrafilter monad,
given by ηX(x) = x˙ = {A ∈ PX | x ∈ A}. Every functor T induces a trivially
weakly copointed functor T × U , with second projection as the weak copoint.
Instead of the identity of the present state, a weakly copointed functor contains
only a description of the present state, which in general may fail to be realized as
an actual state. However, weakly copointed functors relate tightly to copointed
functors in the standard sense:
Lemma and Definition 3.4 Let (T, ε) be a weakly copointed functor. Then
TcX = {t ∈ TX | ε(t) principal}
defines a copointed subfunctor of Tc, the copointed part of T , with copoint εc
defined by εc(t) ∈
⋂
ε(t). Moreover, every proper T -coalgebra C = (X, ξ)
factors through the inclusion TcX →֒ TX, inducing a coalgebra Cc for the
copointed functor Tc. Given a similarity type Λ with assigned predicate liftings
for T , we obtain predicate liftings for Tc by restriction; then, a state x ∈ X
satisfies the same Λ-formulae in C as in Cc.
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(Recall that an ultrafilter α is principal if
⋂
α 6= ∅, and then necessarily |
⋂
α| =
1.)
Remark 3.5 Indeed, the above lemma implies that weakly copointed functors
are not strictly required for our current target results, which are all formulated
over proper coalgebras. We nevertheless do involve them in the technical de-
velopment because of their natural role within coalgebraic logic: The 0-1-step
logic, in the sense introduced in the next section, of the canonical Λ-structure,
which will be based on a weakly copointed functor, is strongly complete; this
would be impossible for any Λ-structure based on a copointed functor. For
details, see Remark 6.7.
Remark 3.6 The standard coalgebraic semantics of rank-1 modal logics as
recalled above embeds into the copointed setting by converting plain functors T
into trivially copointed functors T × id or trivially weakly copointed functors
T × U , with modalities interpreted via first projections: Given a Λ-structure
based on the functor T , we obtain a Λ-structure based on the trivially copointed
functor T × id by putting
(t, x) |= L(A1, . . . , An) iff t |= L(A1, . . . , An)
for A1, . . . , An ⊆ X and (t, x) ∈ TX×X , similarly for T×U . Proper coalgebras
for T×id and proper coalgebras for T×U are both essentially the same as (plain)
coalgebras for T , and it is easy to see that the respective modal semantics over
T -coalgebras and over proper T × id- or T × U-coalgebras are equivalent.
Remark 3.7 The categorical concept of a comonad extends the notion of co-
pointed functor by additionally assuming an unfolding operation δ : T → T ◦T
(the comultiplication) satisfying certain equational laws. This amounts to let-
ting T contain information about the entire finite-time future development of
the present state: Iterating δ, we can extract evolutions of any depth n, i.e. el-
ements of T nX , from a given element of TX . Comonads can thus be employed
to capture iterative frame conditions such as ✷a → ✷✷a, with the technical
caveat that this requires restricting the branching degree of models to avoid
set-theoretic existence problems. Since the meta-theory of iterative frame con-
ditions is in general much less well-behaved than that of non-iterative ones (e.g.
recall the cited result on failure of strong completeness over neighbourhood se-
mantics [17]), one should manage expectations regarding the perspective of
results in comparable generality as the present one.
4 The 0-1-Step Logic
An important driving principle of coalgebraic logic is to reduce metatheoretic
properties of a full-blown modal logic with nested modalities, interpreted over
coalgebras, to similar properties of a much simpler one-step logic where formu-
lae feature precisely one layer of modalities, and are interpreted over structures
that essentially model just one transition step (hence the name). To cover non-
iterative logics, we need to extend this principle to cover also the current state
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(besides its successors), arriving at the 0-1-step logic of the given modal logic.
For readability, we restrict the technical development to unary modalities from
now on; covering higher arities requires no more than additional indexing, and
we continue to use higher arities in the examples.
Syntax and derivations In formulae of the 0-1-step logic, we intentionally
mix syntax and semantics, replacing propositional variables by their values in a
powerset Boolean algebra. That is, given a non-iterative logic L = (Λ,A) and a
set X , we take Prop(Λ(PX)∪PX) to be the set of 0-1-step formulae over PX ,
referring to elements of PX as (interpreted) propositional atoms. We denote
the evaluation of a Prop(PX)-formula φ in the Boolean algebra PX by JφK,
and say that φ is propositionally valid over PX if JφK = X . We will identify
occurrences of subformulae φ ∈ Prop(PX) with JφK when they lie in scope of a
modal operator but not otherwise, i.e. on the uppermost level. This evaluation
of inner propositional formulae allows us to omit the modal congruence rule.
We thus define 0-1-step derivability ⊢0-1L ψ of 0-1-step formulae ψ inductively
by the rules
ψσ
(ψ ∈ A, σ a Prop(PX)-substitution)
φ1, . . . , φn
ψ
({φ1, . . . , φn} ⊢PL ψ)
φ
(φ ∈ Prop(PX), JφK = X).
(Non-iterative rules φ/ψ as in Remark 2.2, if present, are also applied in sub-
stituted form: if JφσK = X for a Prop(PX)-substitution σ, then derive ψσ.)
That is, ⊢0-1L ψ iff ψ is propositionally entailed by
{ψσ | ψ ∈ A, σ a Prop(PX)-substitution} ∪ {φ | φ ∈ Prop(PX), JφK = X}.
We write Φ ⊢0-1L ψ if ⊢
0-1
L (φ1∧ . . .∧φn)→ ψ for some φ1, . . . , φn ∈ Φ. A set Φ
of 0-1-step formulae over PX is 0-1-step consistent if Φ 6⊢0-1L ⊥.
Semantics Fix a weakly copointed functor (T, ε) and a Λ-structureM based
on T . Define the unary predicate lifting ι by ιX(A) = {t ∈ TX | A ∈ ε(t)}.
The 0-1-step satisfaction relation t |=0-1X ψ between functor elements t ∈ TX
and 0-1-step formulae ψ over PX is inductively defined by
t 6|=0-1X ⊥
t |=0-1X ¬φ iff t 6|=
0-1
X φ
t |=0-1X φ ∧ ψ iff t |=
0-1
X φ and t |=
0-1
X ψ
t |=0-1X Lφ iff t ∈ JLKX(φ)
t |=0-1X B iff t ∈ ιX(B)
where B ∈ PX in the last clause, and JψK0-1X = {t ∈ TX | t |=
0-1
X ψ}. The last
clause thus deals with top-level interpreted propositional atoms. Note that in
accordance with the above convention, the second to last clause omits inter-
pretation of modal arguments, which are already identified with their interpre-
tation. We say that ψ is satisfiable if JψK0-1X 6= ∅, and we write TX |=
0-1
X ψ
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if JψK0-1X = TX . We generally refer to maps τ : V → PX as PX-valuations.
Given a non-iterative axiom ψ, we write ψτ for the 0-1-step formula obtained
from ψ by substituting according to τ . Then, ψ is 0-1-step sound for M if
TX |=0-1X ψτ for every set X and every PX-valuation τ . Conversely, the
logic L = (Λ,A), or just A, is 0-1-step complete for M if every 0-1-step for-
mula ψ over PX such that TX |=0-1X ψ is 0-1-step derivable (⊢
0-1
L ψ), equiva-
lently if every 0-1-step consistent formula is satisfiable. The same terminology
applies to non-iterative rules (Remark 2.2) (specifically, a non-iterative rule
φ/ψ is 0-1-step sound if TX |=0-1X ψτ whenever JφτK = X).
To enable an appropriate statement of soundness, we extend the semantics
of the logic to allow for frame conditions : We refer to a pair (C, π) consisting
of a T -coalgebra C = (X, ξ) and a valuation π : V → PX of the propositional
variables as a T -model. We define satisfaction x |=(C,π) ψ of 0-1-step formulae
ψ ∈ Prop(Λ(Prop(V ) ∪ V )) in states x of T -models (C, π) by the same clauses
as for |=C (Section 3), and additionally
x |=(C,π) a iff x ∈ π(a)
for a ∈ V . We say that C satisfies the frame condition ψ if x |=(C,π) ψ for
all T -models (C, π). Of course, if C satisfies the frame condition ψ then ψ is
sound for C, i.e. every state in C satisfies all substitution instances of ψ.
Lemma 4.1 (Soundness) If a non-iterative axiom ψ over V is 0-1-step
sound over a Λ-structureM based on a weakly copointed functor T , then every
proper T -coalgebra satisfies the frame condition ψ; hence, ψ is sound for the
class of all proper T -coalgebras.
We proceed to discuss in more detail how non-iterative axioms are absorbed
into (weakly) copointed functors. Given a (weakly) copointed functor T and a
set A′ of additional non-iterative axioms, we can pass to the (weakly) copointed
subfunctor TA′ of T given by
TA′X = {t ∈ T | t |=
0-1
X φσ for all φ ∈ A
′ and all PX-substitutions σ}
and restrict the Λ-structure to TA′ in the evident way. By construction, the
axioms in A′ are 0-1-step sound over TA′ , and the proper TA′ -coalgebras are
precisely those proper T -coalgebras that satisfy the axioms in A′ as frame
conditions. Moreover, we have
Lemma 4.2 In the notation introduced above, suppose that the set A of non-
iterative axioms is 0-1 step sound and 0-1 step complete over T . If A′ mentions
only finitely many modalities, then A∪A′ is 0-1-step complete over TA′ .
Proof (sketch) Observe that if ψ is a 0-1-step formula over PX such that
TA′X |=0-1X ψ, with X assumed to be finite w.l.o.g., then TX |=
0-1
X (
∧
Φ)→ ψ
where Φ contains representatives up to propositional equivalence of all instances
of axioms in A′ under PX-substitutions; the assumptions guarantee that we
can take Φ to be finite. ✷
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Example 4.3 (i) We have recalled the coalgebraic view on standard
Kripke semantics in Example 3.2.i. The usual axioms of the modal logic K
(✷⊤ and ✷(a → b) → ✷a → ✷b) are 0-1-step complete over the trivially co-
pointed functor P × id induced by the functor P ; this is implied by translating
the known one-step completeness of these axioms over P [10] into the copointed
setting as indicated in Remark 3.6. It follows by Lemma 4.2 that these axioms,
together with the T -axiom ✷a → a, are 0-1-step complete for the copointed
functor T given by
TX = {(B, x) ∈ PX ×X | (B, x) |= ✷A→ A for all A ∈ PX}.
It is easy to see that TX = {B, x) ∈ PX×X | x ∈ B}, i.e. T coincides with the
copointed functor recalled on p. 7, whose proper coalgebras are the reflexive
Kripke frames.
(ii) The assumption that the additional axioms only mention finitely many
modalities is really needed; without it, the claim fails even in the rank-1 case.
For instance, let S be the subdistribution functor, which assigns to a set X the
set SX of discrete subdistributions on X , where a subdistribution is defined
like a distribution except that the weight of the whole set is required to be at
most 1 rather than equal to 1. We use modalities Lp ‘with weight at least p’
with the same semantics as in the probabilistic case (Example 3.2.ii). Take the
set
A′ = {¬L1⊤} ∪ {L1−1/n⊤ | n ≥ 1}
of rank-1 axioms. Then (S × id)A′X = ∅ for all X , so that (S × id)A′X |=0-1X
⊥, but ⊥ is not derivable under the given axioms (together with any sound
axiomatization of S), as any derivation of ⊥ could only use a finite subset
of A′, and all such finite subsets are clearly consistent.
A key role in the completeness proof will be played by the following subformula
property of the 0-1-step logic, which extends [16, Proposition 24] from rank-1
to non-iterative logics.
Proposition 4.4 Let ψ be a 0-1-step formula over PX such that ⊢0 -1L ψ.
Then ψ is 0-1-step derivable using only Prop(A)-instances of axioms and
Prop(A)-formulae valid over PX, where A ⊆ PX are the sets occurring in ψ.
The proof requires some facts about propositional logic.
Lemma 4.5 Let V and W be disjoint finite sets. For an A-valuation τ on V
with A ⊆ PX and a system of Boolean equations φiτ = ψiτ for i = 1, . . . , n
where φi, ψi ∈ Prop(V ∪W ), if there exists an A-valuation κ for W such that
φiτκ = ψiτκ for i = 1, . . . , n, then there exists a Prop(V )-substitution σ on W
such that
(i) φiστ = ψiστ for i = 1, . . . , n
(ii) xκ ⊆ JxστK for x ∈ W if |W | = 1.
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(Claim (i) says effectively that if Boolean equations with coefficients in A are
solvable in A, then they are solvable by Boolean combinations of the coefficients
that actually occur. Claim (ii) is only needed later.)
Proof. (i): This is well-known but we need the construction for Claim (ii). We
immediately reduce to a single equation φτ = ⊤ where φ =
∧n
i=1(φi ↔ ψi).We
construct σ by induction over |W |, with trivial base |W | = 0. In the inductive
step, we pick x ∈W and obtain, by Boolean expansion,
φ ≡ (x→ φ[⊤/x]) ∧ (¬x→ φ[⊥/x])
≡ (x→ φ[⊤/x]) ∧ (¬φ[⊥/x]→ x),
which in turn entails ¬φ[⊥/x] → φ[⊤/x], so by assumption the equation
(¬φ[⊥/x] → φ[⊤/x])τ = ⊤ over W \ {x} is solved by κ, and hence by in-
duction solvable by some Prop(V )-substitution σ′. Thus, the substitution
σ = [φ[⊤/x]/x]σ′
for W satisfies φστ = ⊤.
(ii): Let W = {x}; we then have constructed σ = [φ[⊤/x]/x] in (i). We
have to show κ(x) ⊆ Jφ[⊤/x]τK. Let y ∈ κ(x) and assume w.l.o.g. that φ
is in CNF, and that x appears in at most one literal in every clause ψ in φ.
We have to show that y ∈ Jψ[⊤/x]τK. If the literal x appears in ψ, then this
holds trivially. Otherwise, ψ must contain some literal not mentioning x whose
interpretation contains y, since ψτκ = ⊤ by assumption and y /∈ J(¬x)κK =
J(¬x)τκK. Therefore y ∈ Jφ[⊤/x]τK as required. ✷
Lemma 4.6 Let Φ ⊆ Prop(V ), let ψ ∈ Prop(V ), and let σ be a W -substitution
on V and τ a U -substitution on V such that τ(a) = τ(b) whenever σ(a) = σ(b)
for all a, b ∈ V , and moreover Φσ ⊢PL ψσ. Then Φτ ⊢PL ψτ .
Lemma 4.7 Let Φ ⊆ Prop(V ), and let ψ ∈ Prop(V ). Given a U -substitution σ
and a W -substitution τ on V , if Φσ ⊢PL ψσ then Φτ ∪ Ψ ⊢PL ψτ , where
Ψ = {τ(a)↔ τ(b) | a, b ∈ V, σ(a) = σ(b)}.
Lemma 4.8 Let V and W be disjoint sets, let W0 ⊆W , let Φ ⊆ Prop(V ), let
ψ ∈ Prop(W0), and let σ and τ be W -substitutions on V such that τ(a) = τ(b)
whenever σ(a) = σ(b) and τ(a) = c whenever σ(a) = c for all a, b ∈ V and
c ∈W0, and moreover Φσ ⊢PL ψ. Then Φτ ⊢PL ψ.
Proof. Let σ′ and τ ′ be the W -substitutions on V ∪W0 such that σ′(w) =
τ ′(w) = w for w ∈ W0 and σ′(v) = σ(v), τ ′(v) = τ(v) for v ∈ V . The claim
then follows by Lemma 4.6. ✷
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Let V be a sufficiently large set of proposi-
tional variables. Then there are finite sets Φ1 of Prop(V )-instances of axioms
and Φ2 ⊆ Prop(V ) that we can assume to be instantiated by a single PX-
valuation σ such that the formulae in Φ2σ are propositionally valid over PX
and (Φ1 ∪ Φ2)σ ⊢PL ψ. By Lemma 4.8, it suffices to show that there is a
Prop(A)-substitution τ that solves the following system of equations:
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• For all subformulae Lρ, Lρ′ in Φ1 such that (Lρ)σ = (Lρ
′)σ in Λ(PX), we
have (Lρ)τ = (Lρ′)τ in Λ(PX). This amounts to an equation ρ = ρ′.
• For all subformula LA in ψ and Lρ in Φ1 such that LA = (Lρ)σ in Λ(PX),
we have LA = (Lρ)τ in Λ(PX). This amounts to an equation A = ρ.
• For all subformulae ρ, ρ′ in Φ1∪Φ2 that do not lie beneath a modal operator
and are such that ρσ = ρ′σ, we have ρτ = ρ′τ in PX . This amounts to
an equation ρ = ρ′.
• For all subformulae A in ψ and ρ in Φ1 ∪ Φ2 that do not lie beneath a
modal operator and are such that ρσ = A in PX , we have ρτ = A in PX .
This amounts to an equation A = ρ.
By construction, this system of Boolean equations is solvable by σ, and since
only sets from A appear in the equations, by Lemma 4.5.(i) it is also solvable
by a Prop(A)-substitution with the required properties. ✷
5 Copointed Coalgebraic Logics are Non-Iterative
We next establish that weakly copointed functors are indeed characterized by
non-iterative axioms; that is, we fix for this section a Λ-structureM based on a
weakly copointed functor T and show that there is a set of non-iterative axioms
that is sound and weakly complete over the class of all proper T -coalgebras.
(We necessarily restrict to weak completeness, since coalgebraic modal logics
in general fail to be compact [14]). In more detail, we show that 0-1-step com-
pleteness of a non-iterative axiomatization implies its weak completeness over
finite models, and we show that the set of all 0-1-step sound non-iterative ax-
ioms is 0-1-step complete. The proofs are fairly straightforward generalizations
of the rank-1 case [14]. We begin with the latter step:
Theorem 5.1 The set of all 0-1-step sound 0-1-step axioms is 0-1-step com-
plete.
Proof. By Remark 2.2, it suffices to show that the set of all 0-1-step sound non-
iterative rules is 0-1-step complete. Let TX |=0-1X ψ for a 0-1-step formula ψ
over PX . Then ψ has the form ψ = ψ0τ for ψ0 ∈ Prop(Λ(V0)∪V0), with V0 ⊆ V
finite, and a PX-valuation τ . Let φ be the conjunction of all clauses χ over V0
such that JχτK = X ; then JφτK = X . We are thus done once we show that
φ/ψ0 is 0-1-step sound. So assume JφσK = Y for a PY -valuation σ. We have
to show TY |=0-1Y ψ0σ. For each y ∈ Y there is x ∈ X such that for all a ∈ V0
we have x ∈ τ(a) iff y ∈ σ(a) (otherwise there is a clause χ over V0 such that
X |= χτ but Y 6|= χσ, contradicting Y |= φσ). Therefore there is f : Y → X
such that σ(a) = f−1[τ(a)] for all a ∈ V0. By naturality of predicate liftings
(including ι) and commutation of preimage with all Boolean operations, we
have Jψ0σK
0-1
Y = Tf
−1[Jψ0τK
0-1
X ], and therefore TY |=
0-1
Y ψ0σ as required. ✷
We will base all our model constructions on the following central notions:
Definition 5.2 A set Σ of formulae is closed if it is closed under subformulae
and negations of formulae that are not themselves negations. We write CΣ
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for the set of maximally consistent subsets of Σ. For a Λ-formula φ, we write
φˆ = {Φ ∈ CΣ | φ ∈ Φ}.
Lemma 5.3 [14, Lemma 27] Let φ be a propositional formula over V , σ a
Σ-substitution and σˆ a P(CΣ)-valuation with σˆ(a) = ψˆ when σ(a) = ψ. Then
JφσˆK = CΣ iff ⊢L φσ.
Definition 5.4 Let Σ be closed. A coalgebra (CΣ, ξ) is coherent if for all
Lψ ∈ Σ, Φ ∈ CΣ,
ξ(Φ) ∈ JLKCΣ(ψˆ) iff Lψ ∈ Φ.
Lemma 5.5 (Truth lemma [14]) Let Σ be closed, and let C = (CΣ, ξ) be a
coherent T -coalgebra and let φ ∈ Σ. For all φ ∈ Σ we then have Φ |=C φ iff
φ ∈ Φ.
Thus, model constructions reduce to showing the existence of coherent coalge-
bra structures. The latter requires the following lemma, which for later reuse
we prove for possibly infinite Σ:
Lemma 5.6 Let VΣ denote the set {aφ | φ ∈ Σ}, and let Φ ⊆ Prop(Λ(VΣ)∪VΣ).
Let σ be the substitution given by σ(aφ) = φ, and let σˆ be the PCΣ-valuation
given by σˆ(aφ) = φˆ. If Φσ is consistent, then Φσˆ is 0-1-step consistent.
Proof. By contraposition; so assume Φσˆ ⊢0-1Σ ⊥. By Proposition 4.4, there is
a derivation that uses only Prop(A)-instances of axioms and Prop(A)-formulae
valid over PCΣ, for A = {φˆ | φ ∈ F(Λ)}. We can write the set of these formulae
as Θσˆ for a set Θ ⊆ Prop(Λ(VΣ)∪VΣ). By the definition of 0-1-step derivations,
it follows that (Φ∪Θ)σˆ ⊢PL ⊥. Now let Ψ denote the set {Lρ↔ Lρ′ | ρˆ = ρˆ′}.
The formulae in Ψ are derivable in L by Lemma 5.3 and the congruence rule.
Similarly, let Γ = {φ ↔ φ′ | φˆ = φˆ′}; the formulae in Γ are L-derivable by
Lemma 5.3. By Lemma 4.7, it follows that (Φ ∪ Θ)σ ∪ Ψ ∪ Γ ⊢PL ⊥ and
therefore (again using Lemma 5.3) Φσ ⊢L ⊥. ✷
Lemma 5.7 (Finite existence lemma) Let A be 0-1-step complete, and
let Σ be a finite closed set of formulae. Then there exists a coherent proper
T -coalgebra structure ξ on CΣ.
Proof. Let Φ ∈ CΣ. We show that the requirements on ξ(Φ) form a 0-1-step
consistent 0-1-step formula, implying existence of ξ(Φ) by 0-1-step complete-
ness. Take VΣ, σ and σˆ as in Lemma 5.6. Let
χ =
∧
Lψ∈Φ Laψ ∧
∧
¬Lψ∈Φ ¬Laψ ∧
∧
ψ∈Φ aψ .
We need to show that χσˆ is 0-1-step consistent. By Lemma 5.6, this follows
from consistency of χσ, which in turn is implied by consistency of Φ. ✷
The announced weak completeness result now follows:
Theorem 5.8 (Weak completeness and bounded model property)
Let A be 0-1-step complete for the Λ-structure M. Then A is weakly complete
over finite proper T -coalgebras; specifically, every consistent formula φ is
satisfiable in a finite proper T -coalgebra of size at most 2|φ|.
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Proof. Let Σ be the smallest closed set containing φ. By the finite existence
lemma (Lemma 5.7), there is a proper and coherent T -coalgebra ξ on CΣ; note
|CΣ| ≤ 2|φ|. Since Σ has only finitely many consistent subsets, the consistent
set {φ} is contained in some Φ ∈ CΣ. By the truth lemma, Φ |=(CΣ,ξ) φ. ✷
Remark 5.9 Previous work on the connection between algebraic and coalge-
braic semantics [12] has led to results that in particular cover non-iterative
frame conditions. The technical setup in the mentioned work features an un-
derlying rank-1 logic, equipped with standard coalgebraic semantics using plain
functors, and imposes additional frame conditions as axioms, e.g. non-iterative
frame conditions. One of the results obtained [12, Corollary 37] shows that a
coalgebraic logic with non-iterative frame conditions is weakly complete over
coalgebras satisfying the frame conditions, provided that the frame conditions
mention only finitely many modalities. By Remark 3.6 and Lemma 4.2, these
assumptions allow combining the given rank-1 logic and the additional frame
conditions into a 0-1-step complete logic for the copointed functor defined by
the axioms. The weak completeness result therefore follows also from our The-
orem 5.8, which moreover applies also to sets of non-iterative frame conditions
that mention infinitely many modalities; of course, 0-1-step completeness then
needs to be proved without the help of Lemma 4.2. E.g. this will turn out to be
possible for the canonical Λ-structure introduced next (Lemma 6.3). All that
said, we emphasize again that the results of the present section are obtained by
easy extension of previous results in rank-1 coalgebraic logic [14], and included
primarily to complete the overall picture; the main technical contribution of the
present work lies in the converse implication (to provide a coalgebraic semantics
for a given non-iterative logic), tackled next.
6 The Canonical Λ-Structure
We now construct, for a given non-iterative logic L = (Λ,A) that we fix from
now on, a canonical Λ-structure ML based on a copointed functor ML w.r.t.
which we show soundness and strong completeness by means of a canonical
model construction. As usual, the state space of the canonical model will be
the set of maximally consistent sets, denoted CL (so CL = CF(Λ) in the notation
of Section 5).
We construct the functor ML as follows. For a set X , MLX is the set of
maximally 0-1-step consistent subsets of Prop(Λ(PX) ∪ PX) (i.e. of the set of
0-1-step formulae over PX). For a function f : X → Y , we define MLf by
MLf(Φ) = {φ ∈ Prop(Λ(PY ) ∪ PY ) | φσf ∈ Φ}
where σf is the PX-substitution on PY given by σf (A) = f
−1[A]. We define
a weak copoint ε : ML → U by εX(Φ) = Φ ∩ PX for Φ ∈ MLX , and interpret
L ∈ Λ by
JLKXA = {Φ ∈MLX | LA ∈ Φ} for A ⊆ X .
Of course, we intend an element of MLX to satisfy precisely the 0-1-step for-
mulae that it contains; indeed, we have
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Lemma 6.1 (0-1-step truth lemma) Let ψ be a 0-1-step formula over PX.
Then Φ |=0 -1X ψ iff ψ ∈ Φ, for Φ ∈MLX.
Since a maximally consistent set in MLX must in particular contain all PX-
instances of the axioms in A, it follows that A is 0-1-step sound, and hence
sound by Lemma 4.1, for ML.
With a view to proving also 0-1-step completeness, we note a 0-1-step ver-
sion of the well-known Lindenbaum lemma:
Lemma 6.2 (0-1-step Lindenbaum lemma) Every 0-1-step consistent set
of 0-1-step formulae over PX is contained in a maximal such set.
Proof. By Zorn’s lemma, noting that unions of ascending chains of 0-1-step
consistent sets are again 0-1-step consistent. ✷
From the 0-1-step truth lemma and the 0-1-step Lindenbaum lemma, 0-1-step
completeness is immediate:
Lemma 6.3 The logic L is 0-1-step complete for ML.
By Theorem 5.8, this implies weak completeness and the finite (in fact,
bounded) model property:
Corollary 6.4 The logic L is weakly complete over finite proper ML-
coalgebras.
Our main result, established in the next section, will show that L is in fact
strongly complete over properML-coalgebras (of course, one can then no longer
restrict to finite coalgebras). As indicated in the introduction, the canonical
Λ-structure is essentially neighbourhood semantics. We proceed to elaborate
details.
Recall from Example 3.2.iii that the Λ-neighbourhood functor NΛ is defined
as NΛ =
∏
L∈Λ n-aryQ ◦ ((Q
op)n). Recall that NL induces a weakly copointed
functor NΛ × U . Take NL to be the weakly copointed subfunctor of NΛ × U
defined by the the axioms A, i.e.
NL = (NΛ × U)A
in notation introduced in Section 4. It is straightforward to see that the proper
NL-coalgebras are precisely the Λ-neighbourhood frames satisfying the frame
conditions A. The functors NL andML are naturally isomorphic via the trans-
formation θ : ML → NL given by
θX(Φ)L = ({A ⊆ X | LA ∈ Φ}, {A ⊆ X | A ∈ Φ}),
which is also compatible with the predicate liftings. We can thus translate
Corollary 6.4 into the language of neighbourhood semantics:
Corollary 6.5 The logic L = (Λ,A) is weakly complete over the class of finite
neighbourhood frames that satisfy the axioms in A as frame conditions.
Forster and Schro¨der 17
That is, one instance of the coalgebraic weak completeness theorem (Theo-
rem 5.8) is weak completeness of non-iterative modal logics over their neigh-
bourhood semantics as originally proved by Lewis [9]
Remark 6.6 The weak completeness result in the above-mentioned previous
work on algebraic-coalgebraic semantics [12, Corollary 37] (see Remark 5.9)
similarly puts weak neighbourhood completeness of non-iterative logics in a
coalgebraic context: Given a rank-1 logic L, the canonical Λ-structure for the
given rank-1 logic satisfies the conditions of [12, Corollary 37], in particular is
one-step complete (the simpler version of 0-1-step completeness that applies to
rank-1 logics) [16], and is isomorphic to the subfunctor of the neighbourhood
functor defined by the given rank-1 axioms; [12, Corollary 37] then guarantees
that weak completeness is retained in any extension of L with non-iterative
axioms mentioning only finitely many modalities. By comparison, Corollary 6.5
above removes the restriction to finitely many modalities.
Remark 6.7 (Strong 0-1-step completeness) The strong completeness
proof for rank-1 canonical structures [16] (which shows that every rank-1 logic
is strongly complete over its neighbourhood semantics) can be factored through
establishing strong one-step completeness, i.e. showing that the one-step logic
(the simpler version of the 0-1-step logic that suffices in the rank-1 case) of a
canonical structure is strongly complete [16, Remark 55]. Similarly, the 0-1-
step logic of the canonical Λ-structureML defined above is strongly complete;
that is, for every set X , every consistent set of 0-1-step formulae over PX is
satisfiable over ML. Indeed, this is immediate from the 0-1-step truth lemma
(Lemma 6.1) and the 0-1-step Lindenbaum lemma (Lemma 6.2). On the other
hand, the 0-1-step logic of the copointed part of the canonical Λ-structure, or
indeed of any copointed functor, clearly fails to be strongly complete: Let α be
a non-principal ultrafilter on a set X ; then α can be seen as a set of 0-1-step
formulae over PX , and as such is consistent; but α is clearly not satisfiable over
any copointed functor. Strong completeness of the 0-1-step logic is the moral
reason we include weakly copointed functors in the technical development even
though, as indicated in Remark 3.5, we could in principle short-circuit them.
7 Strong Completeness
We proceed to prove our main result, strong completeness of non-iterative
modal logics over their canonical structure, and hence over their neighbourhood
semantics. The centrepiece of the technical development is an existence lemma;
we set out to prepare its proof. As usual, one has
Lemma 7.1 (Lindenbaum Lemma) Every consistent set of Λ-formulae is
contained in a maximally consistent set.
The existence lemma requires us to show 0-1-step consistency of a set of 0-1-
step formulae specifying coherence and properness. We start with the following
observation, which is fairly immediate by Lemma 5.6:
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Lemma 7.2 Let Φ ∈ CL be a maximally consistent set. Then the set
{Lφˆ | Lφ ∈ Φ} ∪ {¬Lφˆ | ¬Lφ ∈ Φ} ∪ {φˆ | φ ∈ Φ}
of 0-1-step formulae over PCL is 0-1-step consistent.
The key step is then to extend the last component of the union above from
expressible subsets of CL to arbitrary subsets:
Lemma 7.3 Let Φ ∈ CL be a maximally consistent set. Then the set
{Lφˆ | Lφ ∈ Φ} ∪ {¬Lφˆ | ¬Lφ ∈ Φ} ∪ Φ˙
of 0-1-step formulae over PCL is 0-1-step consistent.
Recall here that Φ˙ = {A ⊆ CL | Φ ∈ A} is the principal ultrafilter generated
by Φ, and note Φ˙ ⊇ {φˆ | φ ∈ Φ}. The proof makes central use of Lemma 4.5.(i)
and (ii) in a step-wise elimination of atoms in Φ˙ \ {φˆ | φ ∈ Φ} from 0-1-step
derivations. With Lemma 7.3 in place, the existence lemma follows straight-
forwardly:
Lemma 7.4 (Existence lemma) There exists a coherent proper ML-
coalgebra on CL.
Using the Lindenbaum lemma 7.1 and the truth lemma (Lemma 5.5) in the
standard fashion, we then obtain our main result:
Theorem 7.5 The logic L is strongly complete over proper ML-coalgebras,
and hence over coalgebras for the copointed part (Lemma and Definition 3.4)
of ML.
By the equivalence between the canonical structure and neighbourhood seman-
tics as outlined in Section 6, we thus obtain
Corollary 7.6 Every non-iterative logic L = (Λ,A) is (sound and) strongly
complete over its neighbourhood semantics, i.e. over the class of neighbourhood
frames that satisfy the axioms in A as frame conditions.
8 Application to Deontic Logic
Deontic logic is concerned with modalities of obligation, such as Oφ ‘φ is oblig-
atory’ and O(φ|ψ) ‘given ψ, φ is obligatory’ (conditional obligation). It is faced
with with specific challenges; e.g., conditional obligations are defeasible, and
it is therefore nontrivial to come with principles of factual detachment, i.e. of
deriving actual from conditional obligations, and moreover one needs to avoid
the deontic explosion that would be caused by unrestricted normality of the
obligation modality: If one had an axiom (Oa ∧Ob)→ O(a ∧ b), then a single
dilemma (Oa ∧O¬a) would cause impossible obligations (O⊥), making every-
thing obligatory if additionally monotonicity is imposed. Recent developments
in deontic logic often are driven mostly axiomatically, so that the only available
semantics is neighbourhood semantics.
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As an example, we treat axioms for factual detachment proposed by
Straßer [19]. The full logical framework uses principles of adaptive logic to
govern the actual factual detachment mechanism; here, we concentrate on the
underlying deontic logics called the base logics of the framework. The logic
distinguishes specific types of obligation respectively called instrumental and
proper (we refer to [19] for their philosophical definition), and has modali-
ties O(− | −) (binary conditional obligation), Oi (unary instrumental obliga-
tion), Op (unary proper obligation), and •iO(− | −) , •pO(− | −); the latter
two binary modalities serve to block factual detachment of instrumental and
proper obligations from conditional obligations, respectively. Corresponding
dual permission modalities are denoted by replacing O with P . Various ax-
iomatizations are developed as extensions of Goble’s logic CPDM, which is
aimed at avoiding the deontic explosion and is axiomatized in rank 1 [4]. In
the online appendix [18] to [19], it is shown that two such logics CDPM.2d+
and CDPM.2e+ are weakly complete w.r.t. neighbourhood semantics when
nesting of modalities is excluded. These logics are non-iterative; they include
congruence rules and various rank-1 axioms that we refrain from listing in full,
and properly non-iterative axioms
(O(a | b) ∧ b ∧ ¬ •p O(a | b))→ Opa (FDp)
(O(a | b) ∧ b ∧ ¬ •i O(a | b))→ Oia (FDi)
(O(a | b) ∧ ¬a ∧ b)→ •iO(a | b) (fV)
((P (¬a | b ∧ c) ∨O(¬a | b ∧ c)) (Ep)
∧ b ∧ c ∧ P (b ∧ c | b) ∧O(a | b))→ •pO(a | b)
((P (¬a | b ∧ c) ∨O(¬a | b ∧ c)) (oV-Ei)
∧ b ∧ c ∧O(a | b))→ •iO(a | b)
where we have converted (Ep) and (oV-Ei) from rules to axioms (Remark 2.2).
E.g. (FDp) says that we can detach a proper obligation Opa from a conditional
O(a | b) if this is not blocked and b is actually the case, and (fV ) say that
detaching an instrumental obligation Oia from a conditional obligation O(a | b)
is blocked if the obligation is factually violated (¬a∧ b). By our Corollary 7.6,
the fully modal versions (with nested modalities) of both CDPM.2d+ and
CDPM.2e+ are strongly complete w.r.t. neighbourhood semantics.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown that every non-iterative modal logic is strongly complete over
neighbourhood semantics, complementing a classical result by Lewis stating
that every such logic is weakly complete and has the finite model property over
neighbourhood semantics. Our proof is via coalgebraic semantics, and indeed
our main result can be phrased as saying that non-iterative logics are strongly
complete over their canonical coalgebraic semantics. A fine point in the coal-
gebraic semantics is that conceptually, the proof needs to use weakly copointed
functors, equipped with a natural transformation into the ultrafilter functor
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instead of the identity functor like copointed functors, to incorporate non-
iterative frame conditions, instead of copointed functors as one would expect.
That is, the natural generalization of the construction for the rank-1 case [16],
which uses maximally consistent sets in the so-called 0-1-step logic, produces
only a weakly copointed functor. Ex post, however, our main result then does
imply completeness w.r.t. a copointed subfunctor. We have applied these re-
sults to deontic logics allowing factual detachment, obtaining that these logics
are strongly complete over neighbourhood semantics, improving on previous
weak completeness results [19]. It will be interesting to connect our results to
coalgebraic ultrafilter extensions [6] and the coalgebraic Goldblatt-Thomason
theorem [7].
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Appendix
A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.4. We have to show that Tf(t) ∈ TcY for f : X → Y
and t ∈ TcX . By naturality of ε, this amounts to showing that Uf preserves
principal ultrafilters. But this is just naturality of the unit η of the ultrafilter
monad. The remaining claims are then clear. ✷
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let σ be an F(Λ)-substitution. Let C = (X, ξ) be a
proper T -coalgebras and let σˆ be the PX-valuation with σˆ(a) = Jσ(a)KC for
all a ∈ V . By definition of 0-1-step soundness we have TX |=0-1X ψσˆ. We have
to show that ψσ is valid. We prove the stronger claim that for we have
{x ∈ X | ξ(x) ∈ JφσˆK0-1X } = JφσKC
by induction over φ ∈ Prop(Λ(Prop(V )) ∪ V ). The Boolean cases are triv-
ial. The case for modal operators is just by expanding definitions: We have
J(Lφ)σˆK0-1X = JLK(JφσˆK) = JLK(JφσKC ), where the last step is by induction, and
ξ(x) ∈ JLK(JφσKC ) iff x |=C (Lφ)σ.
For the case φ = a ∈ V , we have to show {x ∈ X | ξ(x) ∈ ι(σˆ(a))} =
Jσ(a)KC . So let x ∈ X . Then
ξ(x) ∈ ι(σˆ(a))
⇐⇒ σˆ(a) ∈ ε(ξ(x)) (definition)
⇐⇒ σˆ(a) ∈ x˙ (ξ proper)
⇐⇒ x ∈ σˆ(a)
⇐⇒ x ∈ Jσ(a)KC
✷
Proof of Lemma 4.2 Let ψ be a 0-1-step formula over PX such that
TA′X |=0-1X ψ One shows analogously to [14, Proposition 23] that the 0-1-step
logic has the finite (in fact, exponential) model property; we can thus assume
that X is finite. Since A′ mentions only finitely many modality, this implies
that there are, up to propositional equivalence, only finitely many different
Prop(PX)-instances of the axioms in A′; let φ denote the conjunction of these
finitely many instances. Then TX |=0-1X φ → ψ. By 0-1-step completeness
of A, it follows that ⊢0-1L φ → ψ, and hence ⊢
0-1
L′ ψ for L
′ = (Λ,A ∪ A′), as
required. ✷
Proof of Lemma 4.6 Let κ be the U -substitution such that τ = σκ and
assume Φσ ⊢PL ψσ. Then by the substitution lemma of propositional logic it
follows that Φσκ ⊢PL ψσκ ✷
Proof of Lemma 4.7. For each equivalence class [a]σ of the equivalence rela-
tion ∼σ on V given by a ∼σ b iff σ(a) = σ(b), fix a representative v([a]σ), and
let τ ′ be the W -substitution defined by τ ′(a) = τ(v([a]σ)). Then Φσ ⊢PL ψσ
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implies Φτ ′ ⊢PL ψτ ′ by Lemma 4.6. Lastly, Φτ ∪Ψ entails Φτ ′ and {ψτ ′} ∪Ψ
entails ψτ . ✷
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Induction over ψ, where the cases for Boolean opera-
tors are by the Hintikka property of maximally consistent sets. The cases for
modal operators and formulae of the form ψ ∈ PX are by construction. ✷
Proof of Lemma 6.3 We have to show that every one-step consistent formula
is satisfiable. This is immediate from the 0-1-step Lindenbaum lemma 6.2 and
the 0-1-step truth lemma 6.1. ✷
Proof of Lemma 7.2. Take V = {aφ | φ ∈ F(Λ)}, let σ be the F(Λ)-
substitution given by σ(aφ) = φ, and let σˆ be the PCL-valuation given by
σˆ(aφ) = φˆ. Lastly, put
Ψ = {Laφ | Lφ ∈ Φ} ∪ {¬Laφ | ¬Lφ ∈ Φ} ∪ {aφ | φ ∈ Φ}.
The claim states that Ψσˆ is is 0-1-step consistent. By Lemma 5.6, this follows
from the fact that Ψσ = Φ is consistent. ✷
Proof of Lemma 7.3. Let V = {aφ | φ ∈ F(Λ)}∪{aA | A ∈ PCL}, and let τ
be the PCL-valuation given by τ(aφ) = φˆ for φ ∈ F(Λ) and τ(aA) = A for
A ∈ PCL. Put
Ψ = {Laφ | Lφ ∈ Φ} ∪ {¬Laφ | ¬Lφ ∈ Φ} ∪ {aφ | φ ∈ Φ}
By Lemma 7.2, Ψτ is 0-1-step consistent. We have to show that Ψτ ∪ Φ˙ is
0-1-step consistent. Assume the contrary, i.e. Ψτ ∪ Φ˙ ⊢0-1L ⊥. Then we have
a finite subset Ψ0 ⊆ Ψ, a finite set Γ ⊆ {aA | A ∈ Φ˙}, a finite set Θ1 of
axioms, and a finite set Θ2 ⊆ Prop(V ), which we can assume to be instantiated
by κτ for a V -substitution κ (every subset of CL has a name in V , and we
can disjointly rename variables in axioms to ensure that we can use the same
substitution κ throughout), such that the formulae in Θ2κτ are propositionally
valid over PX , and
(Ψ0 ∪ Γ ∪ (Θ1 ∪Θ2)κ)τ ⊢PL ⊥.
We proceed by induction over |Γ|. For |Γ| = 0 we obtain Ψτ ⊢0-1L ⊥, con-
tradicting Lemma 7.2. Now let |Γ| = n > 0. By Lemma 4.8, we have
(Ψ ∪ Γ ∪ (Θ1 ∪ Θ2)κ)τ
′ ⊢PL ⊥ for any Prop(PCL)-substitution τ
′ that solves
the following system of Boolean equations:
• For all subformulae Lρ, Lρ′ in (Ψ0∪Γ∪ (Θ1∪Θ2)κ) such that Lρτ = Lρ′τ
in Λ(PX), we must have Lρτ ′ = Lρ′τ ′ in Λ(PX). This amounts to an
equation ρ = ρ′.
• For all occurrences of subformulae of the form ρ and ρ′ in (Ψ0 ∪Γ∪ (Θ1 ∪
Θ2)κ) that do not lie beneath a modal operator and such that ρτ = ρ
′τ ,
we must have ρτ ′ = ρ′τ ′ in PX . This amounts to an equation ρ = ρ′.
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Now pick a ∈ Γ. Define the PCL-valuation σ to be the restriction of τ to
Γ ∪ {aφ | φ ∈ F(Λ)}. By Lemma 4.5.i, since τ solves the above system of
equations, there is a Prop(V0 ∪ Γ \ {a})-substitution σ′ on {a}, where V0 is the
set of variables occurring in Ψ, such that the above conditions hold for τ ′ = σ′σ.
By Lemma 4.5.ii, since Φ ∈ τ(a) it follows that Φ ∈ Jaσ′σK. It then follows
that aσ′σ is L-derivable from (Ψ∪Γ\{a})σ: Assume without loss of generality
that aσ′σ is in CNF; then every clause of aσ′σ has to contain a literal whose
interpretation contains Φ, and every such literal is contained in (Ψ∪Γ \ {a})σ.
We thus have (Ψ ∪ Γ \ {a})σ ⊢0-1L ⊥, contradicting the induction hypothesis.✷
Proof of Lemma 7.4 (Existence lemma). We define a coherent proper
coalgebra structure ξ : CL → MLCL as follows. Let Φ ∈ CL. By Lemma 7.3
and the 0-1-step Lindenbaum lemma (Lemma 6.2), there is Ψ ∈ MLCL such
that
Ψ ⊇ {Lφˆ | Lφ ∈ Φ} ∪ {¬Lφˆ | ¬Lφ ∈ Φ} ∪ Φ˙
We put ξ(Φ) = Ψ. It is then clear that ξ is coherent; it remains to show that ξ
is proper, i.e. that A ∈ Ψ iff Φ ∈ A, for A ⊆ CL: ‘If’ holds by construction.
For ‘only if’, assume Φ /∈ A ∈ Ψ. But then Φ ∈ CL \ A, so CL \ A ∈ Ψ,
contradicting 0-1-step consistency of Ψ. ✷
Proof of Theorem 7.5. The existence lemma shows that there is a canon-
ical coalgebra C = (CL, ξ) in which, by the truth lemma, every maximally
consistent set is satisfiable. By the Lindenbaum lemma every consistent set is
contained in such a maximally consistent set and therefore also satisfiable. ✷
Details for the proof of Corollary 7.6. The weak copoint on NΛ×U is just
the second projection, while predicate liftings are defined like in Example 3.2.iii,
on the first projection. The precise definition of NL is
NLX = {(N,α) ∈ NLX × UX | (N,α) |=
0-1
X ψσ for all ψ ∈ A
and all PX-substitutions σ}.
To see thatNL is a subfunctor ofNΛ×U , let f : X → Y , and let (N,α) ∈ NLX ;
we have to show (NΛf(N),Uf(α)) ∈ NLY . This follows from the fact that
(NΛf(N),Uf(α)) |=
0-1
Y φ iff (N,α) |=
0-1
X φσf ,
for all φ ∈ Prop(Λ(PY ) ∪ PY ), where σf is the PX-substitution given by
σf (B) = f
−1[B] for B ⊆ Y . This is shown by induction on φ, with trivial
Boolean cases and using naturality of predicate liftings in the modal cases; the
base case B ⊆ Y is just by definition of Uf . It is clear that L is sound for the
Λ-structure based on NL obtained by restricting the original predicate liftings.
Naturality of the transformation θ is clear. The inverse transformation θ−1
is defined on (N,α) ∈ NLX by
θ−1(N,α) = {ψ ∈ Prop(Λ(PX) ∪ PX) | (N,α) |= ψ}.
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Note that θ−1(N,α) is satisfied by (N,α), hence 0-1-step consistent by sound-
ness; it is then clear that θ−1(N,α) is maximally consistent, i.e. in MLX . One
easily checks that θ and θ−1 are really mutually inverse.
It is clear that θ commutes with the respective predicate liftings for NL
and ML; it follows that every proper ML-coalgebra (X, ξ) satisfies the same
Λ-formulae as the induced proper NL-coalgebra (X, θ ◦ ξ), and similarly in the
converse direction; thus, L is sound and strongly complete over proper NL-
coalgebras. Since properness of an NL-coalgebra (X, ξ) implies that the second
component α of ξ(x) = (N,α) is uniquely determined (as x˙) for every x ∈ X ,
proper NL-coalgebras are just Λ-neighbourhood frames satisfying A. ✷
